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United States of America Vol. 113 Co;v ( Oo Q:ongrcssional Record PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION WASHINGTON, MONDAY, MAY 15, 1967 Senate VIETNAM Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have read with great interest the speech by the distingushed Senator from Kentucky 1 Mr. CooPER l, and I also listened to what he had to say and the colloquy which ensued subsequent to his deliverance of the speech. I commend the Senator from Kentucky !Mr. COOPER] for showing his usual calmness, good judgment, restraint, and wisdom in what he has to say, and to assure him that he has a great deal of company in what he has said. When it comes to worrying about the situation in Vietnam, it Is the shadow which affects all our lives, and it is preeminent to the consideration of any other question. When I think of how much Vietnam is costing us in men and money, it makes me sad indeed to consider the tragedy which is the lot of tlus country in that far distant land. We became involved in Vietnam because of mistakes, because of miscalculations, because of misunderstandings, and because of good intentions. As was pointed out in the Senate this afternoon by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota !Mr. YouNG], it is too late to question how or why we got into Vietnam. The question is moot. It belongs to history. There is no question, as far as any Member of the Senate is concerned that I know of, of withdrawing from Vietnam at this time. But I do think the overriding question, if not the only question, in the mind of every Senator, regardless of his position on this subject, whether he is labeled a dove or a hawk, or has no label, is to find a way to the negotiating table, to the ways in which an honorable truce, or an honorable peace or an honorable settlement, can be achieved. It was brought out that perhaps the bombing should be suspended, and that thrs would pave the way to negotiations. Frankly, I would like to advocate a suspension of the bombing, because I have never advocated the bombing itself; but I feel, if we were to suspend the bombing and there were no reaction on the part of North Vietnam, the reaction on our part, both government and people, would be far more bitter and far more dangerous than is the situation at the present time. Perhaps the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] has given us a way out by means of which bombing would be confined to interdiction of supply routes and would increase at the 17th parallel and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It is certainly a proposal worthy of consideration. As far as the membership of this body Is concerned, I wish to state that I believe in the right of dissent. No matter how a Senator is labeled, he does have a right to dissent and the right to express his opinions as he sees fit, but always, I would hope, constructively. I would not consider even those who say, "Go in all the way," or who want to turn North Vietnam back into the Stone No. 75 Vietnam and the United Nations - Johns Hopkins, Nov. Central Concerns of American Foreign Policy North €ritical Components of Current U.S. Foreign Policy 10, 1966 Carolina, March 13, 1967 Cleveland, April 30, 1967 Face the Nation CBS,News, ~ May 7, 1967 Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana 86864 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 15, 1967 there Js ever present the possibility of Its eruption into a war of regional, continental or world-wide dlmenslons. The con!llct In VIet Nam may end, of course, long before It matriculates Into war with China or universal nuclear catastrophe. That Is certainly the rational hope Whether or not It Is an attainable hope Is another mater. In any event, the VIetnamese confilet now, today, already has the capacity to shake the precarious base of cl vlllzed human survival. That will continue to be the case unt!l the war begins to yield to rational settlement. Whatever else It Is, therefore, the war In Viet Nam Is a most urgent warning to all nations. It flashes a danger signal with respect to the adequacy of the present International Instruments of peace. These instruments have not only failed to prevent a breakdown of peace In Viet Nam; they also appear Incapable of restoring peace In any prompt and generally acceptable fashion. It Is high time, therefore, to note with emphasis that the structure of International order which has evolved during the past twenty years Is, to say the least, dangerously haphazard. As It Is now, each state has Its own formula for safeguarding the security of Its people. Each state tends to blend Into that formula, In various combinations, a supply of unl!ateral military power and a participation In a variety of bilateral and regional defense arrangements. Each nation adds to this mixture Its own version of traditional diplomacy and modern variations thereon. Almost all nations complete the blend with a dash of the United Nations. Of late. the role of the United Nations has become less and less pronounced. Indeed, with respect to VietNam the U. N. presence Is scarcely discernible. It Is true that the distinguished Secretary-General. U Thant, has taken public note of the confilct In VIetNam and Its dangers to the world . The SecretaryGeneral Is a man of pence and an exceptional diplomat. He has made clear that he Is more than willing to place his dedica tion and his skills at the disposal of the disputants In Viet Nam. In his diplomatic role, he has outlined views which might provide at some points a basis !or a settlement of the confilet and he has, otherwise, sought tactfully to engage the Interest of various parties In a settlement. With all due respect, however, the sincere efforts of the Secretary-General are hardly to be equated with bringing to bear on this situation the potentials of the United Nations. VIet Nam Is, clearly, a breakdown In the peace within the meaning of the Charter. It contains, clearly, the threat of an expandIng war. With these characteristics, It would appear that the contuct should long since have triggered the utilization of every resource of the United Nations In an effort to restore peace. Yet, I regret to say, that apart from the personal efforts of the Secretary- General, the U.N. reaction to VietNam has had something of the character of that of a disinterested, enervated or Impotent onlookPr. It Is almoot as though the oonfilct In VIet Nam were taking place not on the other side of this planet but rathe: on some other planet entirely. It may be, of oourse, that the U. N. Is unable to make a contribution to peace In Viet Nam. It may also be, however, that the !allure to seek a contribution from the U. N. Is a missing link In the restoration of peace In VietNam. Whatever may be Involved, the non-role of the United Nations In this situation ought not to go unnoticed. An embarrassed silence 1.s no longer a sufficient rooponse to the nation's needs or to the world's needs Urgent though It Is, there Is more Involved In these needs ev-en than ending the war In VIet Nam. There le also at stake the prevention of a more monstrous confilct. There le also at stake the continued Cl'
:posure to a c:roa-aectlon 1 Amer an senUment u It ulsta In Montana where the frost hu lo ~n on the pum,pkln and tb ano 0! wtntu hav already begun to t.her l m t wtth )'OU still strongly aetud wtth what 11 c1 est to the h t of the peop e of m St.a te I have found tn 26 yean of pub c life that on tund~~.mental matters ertl Is n t much d1lrerence between a ntanan outlook and the nat.lorml outlook I U&Ume. therefore t.hat the bMic oonc rll8 of the people of Mont.ann are your baalc concerns Just M bnalc ho are also probably similar. In short, I nssume that what Ia moat Important In Mon· tana Is also likely to be moat Important here In that .eln, I Wls.h that I might say thM the legislative record of the 8 th Congress or some speclftc upect of It Is of fundamental Interest to Americana at this time As you know, the Senate and House de It v;lth a gre t range of public problems during the past two years. Tbe&c problems havtng accumulated o.er a long tlme, had arisen to chAllenge not only the stability of the nation's political and social atructur but even the adequacy of the nation's phySical environment In my Judgment, a very substantial legislative base hw; now been lnld for mcctln these problems. Tbe record of the 89th C)ngress Is Indeed. extraordinary In scope. Tbc cognomen, "Great Congress" may well be apt In any event, as a parllclptult, I should like to tblnk so. Yet, In all honesty, I cannot claim that t.he legislative achievements of these two yeara are n response to what Is m t basic In the concerns and hopes of the people or the nation. I regret to say thnt theee acnlevements, however slgnUlcant, r.re obscured In the shadow which VIet NIUil luui cast over every n peet of the life of the nation The preoccupation of Americans remains VIet Na.m and Ita Implication. E'cry day, these Implications grow more persorml and direct for more youth and their flllllllles. Tbe wa.r Is clearly the nexus of the national anxiety. And peace lies at the heart o! the nation's hopes; peace--Ita honorable restoration at the earliest poSEible moment. I know that you hrn-e heard a great deal or VIet Nam over many months It Is a subJect from whlch you might welcome a mea£-. ure of surcease. By the same token, I would prefer to oonslder some other lesa vexing question, perhapB even the outcome of the election. Yet I am Impelled to return •" thla critical matter tonight. As you may know, problems of foreign relation shave concerned me for many years and, out of that concern, I have frequently addressed myself to the VIetnamese question. 1\fy views on the situation there are generally known and I do not Intend to repeat them In detail here. Certainly, I have said time and aga!n-ln public statements as v;ell as In the prtvate councils of the government--that It does not matter much, at this late date, ~!lw we became Involved In VIet Nam. Tbe point Is that we are Involved, deeply lnvoh d, and we cannot and we wlll not w1thdraw In the absence or an honorable settlement of tbls question Nevertheless, I believe (and I have so stated many times) that It would be to tbe benefit of all concerned 1! there could be an lmmecUatc contraction of the hootlllt:ea and, as ooon as poe31blc thereafter their mplete teiTnlnn tlon I have long ~n persUaded tha tb,. In· tor ts of the U nlt.ed States ca ortzc us aa a Pa.c1flc power but that th.oee 1ntereetll Dl06• certainly do not eotn~nt:nd to us tb roe 0! Asian power. As a Paclflc power rather than &n A&lnn power (and the two are aometlm contused) It Is, In my Judgment v;ho y In our national lntcest to remo e Amcrl.can military Installations and forces from the entire Soutbeo.l!t Aa1An mainland as .IIOOll as that can be dono--e.s aoon ae an honomb e e Is B6SUl'ed y I say that that 'lev. a.ooords w1th the President's proclaimed purpoee In VIe am whlch Ia a <;ettlement achle ed by n 6 3 Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana May is, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 8 6865 prospects o! a high declble of propaganda and Invective, I! the Invitations are accepted, are equally obvious. But these are risks which can readily be sustained when the stakes !or all concerned are as high a.s they are In VIet Nam. Insofar as the United States Is concerned, It le In the Interest of this nation to welcome the confrontation. The open bar o! world opinion Is one before which we must never hesitate or !ear to place this nation's policies. The courses which I have Indicated are llustratlve of the poosibll1tles of using the untapped resource<~ of the United Nations to advance towards peace In VIet Nam. They may or may not be relevant at this time. A vigorous effort on the part of the U.N. may prove a.s futile as all other efforts to date, military and non-rnllltary, to terminate the conflict. But with the world enmshed In the most dangerous lntemational situation since Korea, we must seek by every avenue to fa.c!lltate the restoration of a just peace In Viet Nam. We owe that to the unfortunate people of that nation, to ourselves and to the world. ExHIBIT 2 CENTRAL CONCERNS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (Address by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, before the Carolina Forum, the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., Mar. 13, 1967) Prior to my corning to Congress a quarter of a century ago, I thought my stock of solutions to the questions o! foreign pol!cy was quite adequate. In !act, as a teacher of history at the University of Montana, which I was, I had a touch o! what Senator Fulbrlgh t mlgh t call the arrogance of brain power. In more oommon Idiom, there were time when I thought I knew It all. That may I say, Is a falling common to exceptional historians, from Herodotus to Schlesinger. As a new Member of Congress, my background In history was highly useful. I also discovered, however, that my knowledge of international affairs did not go very far. It did not begin to provide much of an understanding, let alone answers, to the critical issues which were emerging as World War II drew to a clooe. In those days, most of us In government suffered from serious Imperfections In our not.lons of the outside world and widely-held but unfounded hopes !or an automatic postwar peace under the United Nations. We took many wrong tacks along with the right ones In the course o! our foreign poHcy. For many decades to come, historians will be engaged In sorting out the one from the other. We made mistakes In Asia. We made them In Europe. We made them In the UnLted Nat.lons. We made them over the whole range o! emerging new International issues. I, for one, felt my limitations and recognized the need to become a student again. My classroom was Congress, in Committee and on the floor. My extracurricular activity Included a great deal of foreign travel, extensive reading and not a little reflection. To this day, a student I have remained; an expert I am not; and teaching is the profession to which, at some point, I may return. In the latter connection, I should note that my name Is stlll carried, on leave of absence on the rooter o! the University o! Montana: Moreover, thanks to a seniority system In college teaching. second not even to that or the Congress, I now hold the rank o! full Professor of History. I am constrained to point out that teachIng and legislating are the two outstanding examples in AmeriCan society o! the application o! a major tenet of Confucianism; that the accumulation of years 1.s to be equatec: automatically and unquest!onlngly with the accumulation o! wisdom. Tbls principle. I know, Is Insufferable to the young tolerable to the middle-aged, and a comfort to those full of years. At this point In time, I must confess that I find a system o! seniority tolerably comfortable. For the present, I have no hesitancy In Invoking the authority with which seniority endows me, In order that I may speak to you on what seems to me to be the central concerns o! contemporary American foreign policy. Since the end of World War II, I have watched clusters of international problems coalesce Into these concerns. Tbe problems cover a whole range of new and tumultuous change. Tbey are, In part, Ironic byproducts of the Immense acceleration o! development In science, education and communication, transportation and other technologies. Tbey are expressive o! the explosl<>n In population as well a.s the explosion o! nuclear devices. Tbey are Indicative of the growth of human expectations and, hopefully, of human enlightenment. Tbey are problems, however, which despite these new twists, are stlll undergirded by the vast heritage of human Ignorance, fear, want, and hostility from which no part of the globe, is free. The Iceberg of change which has moved In International affairs during the past two decades helps to explain the emergence o! the U.N. and other International organizations. It Is relevant to the social !nstab!ll ty and the militarism which have largely followed the ending of 19th century colonial era, notably In Africa. It is Involved In the Asian catacylsrns--the great economic stirrings In Japan, the immense uncertainties which brood over India and Pakistan and the political tidal waves which, at intervals, have rolled through Chinese society. The many-sided changes In the human condition during the past two decades also explain the first military alliance In peacetime between ourselves and Western Europe as well as the first major military Involvements o! the United States on the Asian mainland. They help to explain, finally, the awakening o! this nation to the problems which confront the world and ourselves as participants In Its lndlvislble destiny. It used to be that we tended to stand apart and aloof from the affairs of the rest of the globe. Some have called that period of our history whlch led up to World War II, the age of Isolation. The characterization is glib and somewhat misleading. We were not so much isolated as we were Insulated by a fortuitous geographic endowment. The greater part of the nation's historic energies, therefore, could, and fortunately did. go Inward Into the development of a rich, ample, and sparsely settled land. We had little need or Inclination which would stimulate us to look much beyond this endowment !or our needs and-!! I may use the term-for our kicks. Except to sustain a limited curlooity and to satisfy a few exotic wants, we avoided an extensl ve overseas projection of American power, particularly outside the Western Hemisphere. From a distance, we were content to hold ourselves up to the rest of the world, on the basis of great material achievements and the political heritage o! the American Revolution, as a prime exa.fnple of the perfectablllty of the national experience. Since World War II, however, we have found ourselves plunged, hands, feet, and head into the mainstream of the world's affairs. We did not seek this role. We did not want it. Most o! us still find the clothes o! a great International power, costly, lll-flttlng and uncomfortable. Nevertheless, we are unable to get out or them. There is even the probability that some o! us have learned not only to tolerate this new garb, but to !Ike lt. In any event, as a sequel to World War II. this nation has come onto the' center o! the stage o! International affairs. In this leading role we have expended an immense amount o! resources, energy, and money for a great variety of purposes. We have developed all manner of costly Intelligence and ln!orrnatlonal services. We have developed towering military services whose annual cost Is now around $70 billion. We have fought one war In Asia, and are now engaged In a second. We have narrowly missed Involvement In several other peripheral clashes elsewhere. More than twenty years after World War II, we still have something on the order of agreements !or mutual security with 40 or more nations. These agreements, In effect, are commitments to mllltary action everywhere on the globe, except, perhaps, the Antarctic. The strategic air force Is on a minutes-alert. Intercontinental and other missiles are pre-set for Instant retallatory launching. Day and night the American navy patrols the seven seas. American soldiers are stationed In many nations abroad; In Europe and VIet Nam, they number In the hundreds of thousands. These far-fiung commitments have been questioned from time to time. In my Judgment, It is most proper that pertinent questions be raised about them. Not only do they Involve great expenditures of publlc funds, they carry, at all times, immense Implications for the very survival o! the nation and clvlllzatlon. As I see It, we have undertaken so many and scattered defense obiiga tlons that any need !or the simultaneous honoring o! a group of these commitments would find us hard-pressE'd to provide even a llmi ted response. For that reason, l! for no other, 1 t seems to me we would be well-advised to look closely at these military commitments and activities and to weigh carefully their contemporary value. It would be futile, however, to consider them In a vacuum. Effective surveillance must relate to the central concerns o! our foreign pollcy wl\.lch, presumably, gave rise to them In the first place. It behooves us to see as clearly as possible whether our understanding of these concerns Is up to date. It Is Incumbent upon us to test and test again the reflexes of our policies not only for adequacy but for excess. It wlll serve no useful purpose to continue to measure these reflexes o! policy by the sort o! generalltles which are expressed by the terms "Isolationism" or "lnternatlonallsm." Whatever may have been the case years ago, these yardsticks have long since lost their pertinence. The labels are no guarantee of the efficacy of any course of action or nonaction In International relations What Is essential Is not the name. What is essential is that the course Is timely and adjusts the bonafide interests of the nation to the realities of the contemporary world. I speak In all candor when I say that there have been tendencies under both Democratic and Republican administrations for foreign policy to lag behind these realities. Until recently, a kind of Inertia, for example, has ex1sted with regard to one of the central concerns o! American foreign rollcy the Unl ted States-Soviet con!ron tatlon in Europe. Until recently, we have been most reluctant to bring ourselves to face, In policy, the changes which have taken place on that continent. To be sure, President Eisenhower sought In his administration to restore at least a measure of clvillty in the conduct of U.S.Sovlet affairs, by his personal associ a tlons with the leaders o! the Soviet Union. To be sure, President Kennedy, In the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, removed a rigidity which, !or years had decreed that ag"eements should not be concluded with the Soviet Union. It has only been in the last year or two, however, that as a nation we have begun to explore fully the Implications o! change In Europe and to react to Its potentialities In terms o! our Interests and world peace. Yet substantial change has been manifest !or some time In Inner developments In both Eastern Europe and ln Western Europe and between the two regions. In Eastern Europe, the immediate postwar Isolation from the Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana 6 66 Q, G IO TAL RECORD-w t ,.... a &e\'tte on~ It wu compounded of po IUcal and war-born 'l'endettaa ld oglcal parochl&llmu reciprocal fe&n~ d th ln· t. rn o: human e e:gy t.o meet the m.a&aln denuwds o: p. t-war reoonstru uon. p«Jally n the death of lin, howevCT, there baa been a nernl loosenln of the ldoologlcal and othtt at.ralt-Jac:kel.a through· out Enatern Europe There haa also been a growing r ponae on the part or ov mmenta thtte t.o consumer needs, tbc a Ua!act on or which lnvol<'es greatly expanded comm rce wllh the non-C'.ommunlst world Aa lndlc the o: the bre:u!th or change, communlcaUOD4, travel, cultural rxchange and other contacts have grown rapidly be· tween F MLem and We tern Europe The rl e or trade Ieala betw n the two regloiUI bns been very pronounc~ and It should be noted that, Berlin Wall notwithsta.ndlng W t Germany lends all other non-Communist nations In commerce with F.a.aUrn Europe For th~e who read the ten lea""' ot omclal IIOCinln.blllty, moreover, I would call attention t.o the recent \isll.a of President l'odgorny or tho Soviet Union to Italy and the first rr<:cp· tlon ot a Chic! or that State by the Pope, u well a.a Premier Kosygtn'a warm rr<:eptlons In Paris and London One may attach such values &.a he choo&ea to the&e e>enl.a. The facts o! change In Europe, bowe,·er, speak for thernsel vea. The talk o! war aubsld!es; the sounds of lntrn-European cooperation a.re hen.rd more clearly on all sides The European detente has not only begun, It Is already well advanced. Our reaction to change In Europe Includes the groundwork o! PrP.sldrnt Eisenhower and President Kennedy a.a well ns the bridgebuilding or President Johnson nil or which I have already mentioned, What Is Involved In the !attn case Is a •ustalned effort In the direction o! restoring normalcy to our relations with the Sov1et Union and a s!gnltlcant reduction ln the m!lltn.ry rl\'alry which, wittingly or unwittingly, could lead to a catastrophic confilet. A number o! s!gn!tlcrmt agreements with the Soviet Union are already Involved In this effort. They deal with cultural exchanges, consulnr questions, commerclnl aviation, and the peaceful use or outer space. Negotiations nre also anticipated, In the near future, to try to llmlt the Incredibly costly rh"Biry or adding successive and reciprocal "anUs" to the ballistic missile systems o! each nation. An attempt l.s also likely to be made to remove certain long-standing and self-Imposed hindrances In law to our peaceful trade "1tb the Eastern European countries. Many or these measures, or course, Involve not only the President but also action by the Congress nnd, partlculn.r!y, by the Senate. And, certainly, they Involve underBtn. nd!ng on the part Of the people Of the nation. However, emot!ona run deep on any question o! U.S. relatlon.s with Communist nations, particularly, In the light or the bloody conftict In VIet Nam. I am !rank to say that I have my own reticences about the pursult or agreemenl.s with nations on one side or the globe, while a war against us Is being waged with tbelr help on the other. The best Judgments we can obtain, however, tell us that the rejection or the contemplated agreements with the Soviet Union nod Ea.stern Europe wtll not make the allghtest dlf! erence In the situation In \'let Nam It wlll. ln no way, diminish our casualties or hasten the conclusion of the con111ct. In tboee clrcumatances, I do not see that It aervee our purpoees to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be In the lntereet o! this nation I do not see that we &dva.nce the cauae ot peace by re!ustng to build more stable relaUone !or peace whenever and wherever an cppcrtunlty to do ao preeenta Itself. MOrt'Onr, brldge-bulldl.ng to Ea.stern Europe Ia not unrelated t.o the poulbiUty or making tructl e cbA .A l&n t e Tre:l r Orga uoo. ld &lao ~,... the natl '8 I many years .x d! na or .Am have n ed to ..AT 0 Europe Tb t 1"(' and tb r to lve n u.s mtll ry w tern Europe or ,. ell o r 1 Arne rlcaiUI It l.s an unc1 r k1 r nts an expenditure r b ll or public !uncls h ~ r Ye begrudge one cent o! th ru persUAded that the x d!v s nt!al to p.eace In Europe tod y ,.ere bellc•ed to be when dl p tched yut11 ago But 18 ~bat the Uoned the change ln U e g tn Europe which expr Itself In a rapidly groW1ng tnule and the cxp:ms n o! other friendly relatlOIUI It shou d also be noted that within Western Europe, th re are ob' !ous doubl.a a.bout the ne~ r r the m:.lntcna. nce o! N.A To nt the strength In which It was previously projected Indeed, the French no longer sec any requirement tor the presence or U.S !ore , at lel>'t no In I'rance, nnd they have withdrawn their ov;n detachments !rom N A T 0. Command The United Kingdom has reduced 11.8 commitment or men and resources to the Continent and hna announced further reductions unless WC6t Germany La prepared to neutrallze the exchange C08ts or m:.lntn!nlng these forces on the Rhine Other \'/estern Europeans to a greater or lesser degree appear to regard their NAT 0. commitments In the same nonurgent fashion It Is now ,·ery evident that the United States c.lone has felt deeply the need to sustain the full military burden ot the eo.rller common commitment to NAT 0 Our all.es In Western Europe are much cl06cr to the firing line; yet, In n period of unprecedented economic prOI'pcr!ty they arc most unwilling to carry their pledged share. In effect, the Wcstocn I:.'uroprans have mnde adjustments In their commitments to NAT 0 to rctlect 0' er-nll changes In Europe and they have ma.de these a.dJustments unllnterally, 'Ibe contrast In performance between ourselves and Western Europe regarding commitments toN A T.O tn my Judgment Is be· coming almoot an embarrassment. It moves us apart !rom the malnstrcam or European developments and La likely to become n source or !rlctlon on both sides which, tn the end, can only be harmful to the Inter ts of both sides. In all !ranknC68, I :O.nd It dliDcult to acquiesce ln Executl>e Branch rears !or Western Europe's safety which are obviously r:ugreater than the fear o! the Europeans tbcm• ch·es. In all !ra.nkne&s, I find BOrne lnck O! dlgnlty In the lengths to whlcb these !ears have carried our diplomacy. We ha>e begged, badgered a.nd buttered Western Europe In an effort to at!muiatc a greater contribution to N.A.T.O. In all fran.knC38, I did not relish this nation having been pl.a.ced In the position or wearing out Ita v.elcome !u France. I should not llke to see thnt experience repeated elsewhere In Europe Yet It may well be repeated unless there Is a willingness to ma.ke timely a.djustmenta. I have, therefore, joined wltb 43 other Senators In the Introduction of a resoluUon which recommends to the President that the Executh·e Branch make substantial reductions ln the present deployment or C'ur forces In Western Europe Personally, I have !elt tor several yeat11 that. t"o or three rather than alx dlvtalons would be more than su!flclent to undenrcore our adherence to the North Atlantic Treatv That figur Ia ln line with estimates or present need ,.b'cb have been advanced by General Elscnbower and General Gavin, both or whom have had • lon association with this quea • n I :O.nd It morst dLmcult t.o romprebend why two d!Vl.s!ona are any leas e'"ectlve than alx In TE May 15 1967 Within Ch.lna, during th .,. yMrs !.here have ~n momentous e•ents which hnvc also added to the dlmcult!ea and uncertalntl,. or developing a cohesive policy tow1U'da the Chlnet.- mainland The Chin have r devlcr.a nt I..op Nor In the Western Asian desert or Slnkb.ng !!< cr.nt Ideological con1l!cts have sent great tr<·mors through the whole or the Inn•,- political structure or China There lull been, llnnlly the great cleav ge In Sino-Soviet re,olut! onary solidarity which hna tom np:>.rt atmoot all or the relationships between th.e tw.:> giant nations o! the F.uru!an Continent In the context of these "' rnl.8, It Is n t rurprlslng that the dust. !or the settlement of wblcb American policy baa waited eighteen ye:>ra Is benv1er than ever The obscurity, moreover, Ia not likely to be dlspell~ In the n r rut re Th~re Is nothing In the recent history o! China ,. hlcb sugg 1.a that It wll! be euler tomorrow than It Is today tor us to see cl rly & direction for ellectlve policy Whatever course or ~rlc;J,n relntloiUI with China, It "'Ill have to be pursued In spite or the dust with which the s!tuntton Ia co er~ C'Jear-eut cbolcea cannot be expected to b avallnble to us any time tn the !or e b e future On the contrary, .American decl.stona Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana ~Jay is, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 86867 respecting ChinA must tnev!tably contal.n a larg~ measure o! subjectivity and prayer. Ever-present, WUl be the posslbU!ty of error. These considerations, may I say, apply not only to wbat we may do respecting China but to what we do not do. The uncertainties and the risks exist no less In the principle or non-approach to which we have adhered over these years of our times. History will someday estimate the contribution of this prtnc!ple-lts addition to or subtraction from the Interests of the United States and the stab!'!ty and peace o! the Western Pac ftc. Under the present approach. !or example, we know from a distance that a great fire rages In the core o! Chinese Communism. The man!!esta.t!ons are plain 1n the roars of the Red Guards, In the denunciations and counter-denunciations, In the sudden fall o! long-estsblished revolutionaries. They are documented In the Inflammatory Ideographs which are slashed over the streets and walls of Peking and the other citadels of Chinese Communist power. They are suggested In the polltlcal bewilderment which Is seen In coastal cities and In the provinces along the Inner borders of China and other remote arens. Indeed, the present turmoil is such as to make clear that Communist political control which, for nearly two decades, was held by many to be total and Irreversible and to extend all the way from MoSCO'V to the farthest reaches of China is actually considerably less than absolute, even In Its extension from Peking to the distant Chinese pro\1nces. We can also note. from afar. the serious difficulties between the Soviet Union and China. The strains have long been explicit In the Ideological realm. They have alw become Increasingly evident In the tension along the Sino-Soviet frontier which runs !or thousands o! miles between the two countries. What appears Involved here Is an expression of the historic projection or Czarist Russian Interests across the Asian mainland towards Alaska and which, before It receded to more tractable limits, had spread even as far as California and Hawaii. This basic Russian projection to the East persists and rubs against China, at least In border regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and In Sink!ang Province. Conversely, an historic Chinese Interest remains in many parts or Soviet Asia which at various times have been under at least nominal Chinese authority. The clash or national Interests of the two nations, in short, Is very real and so, too, are the Irredentist host!l!tles which It engenders. These hostilities have been a mnjor element In the cycle or ever-Increasing bltternesB In Chinese-Soviet relations over the past few years. How long this cycle w!ll last and how It wtll end a.re matters of conjecture. Whatever the posslb!l!t!es. if any, of more etrect!ve adjustment or our pollcles in the llght of this and other trends, however, we a.re inhibited from their pursuit by our current approach or, rather, non-approach to mainland China. Let me turn, finally, to the immediate and over-rld1ng problem of policy, to the situation In VIet Nam. VIet Nam atrecte every other upect o! our foreign relations and, particula.rly, the two central ooncerns. It diminishes our capacity to deal oonstruct!vely with the United States- Soviet confrontation In Europe. To put It mildly, it multiplies the problems of the oon!rontatlon wtth China 1n Asia. It Is ironic that once again In Viet Nam, M in Korea. a country so small and remote from our interest<~ as to be outside the range or even public curiosity a few years ago ha.a become the major preoccupation of the United States. It Is Ironic that, !or the second time in a generation, we find ourselves 1n a devastating war on the borders o! Chlna-not with China-but with a people who have had no tradition o! hostility towards the United States and who have !a.r more hietorte reason than do we !or mutual hootlllty with the Chinese. How deeply we are engaged 1n this Ironic situation Is indicated by the current concentration of United States military force In Southeast Asia and, particularly, In VIetNam. We have well 1n excess of 400.000 millta.ry personnel on the ground in South Viet Nam. There are also approximately 75,000 men on the 7th Fleet in adJacent waters and 35,000 more in Thailand wtth responsibilities that are tied closely Into the situation In Viet Nam. In short, wa have committed to this oontllct over 500,000 members or the Armed Services and materiel and equipment in unprecedented quantities and this Immense consignment Is supported by additional mllltary strength o! all kinds on Okinawa, the Ph!l!pp!nes, and Guam. We a.re in a limited war In which, by becoming deeply engaged, we have managed to save !rom collapse the government o! South Viet Nam In Saigon. The objectives of our military engagement are confined entirely to the southern half o! VIetNam. This llmlted wa.r of limited objectives, nevertheless, ha.s already engaged more American forces than Korea. It has cost more than Korea. It has Incurred plane and hellcopter losses greatly In excess o! those In Korea. It Is a more difficult and dangerous war than ~area. It Is a more bitter and barbaric wa.r. It Is a war whose end is not yet in sight, by military action or by a negotiated diplomatic solution. That Is the reality or the situation in VIet Nam. The more candidly it is faced the better off we wlll be. At this point, the question of how or why we became Involved is moot and so are regrets over our involvement. In my judgment, the question now Is how can this war be ended at the soonest possible moment in afi honorable peace tor ourselves and !or all deeply enmeshed in !t. In short, the question is how can It be ended under honorable circumstances, before the spreadIng devastation, not only In North VIet Nam, but even more, In South VIet Nam, makes a hideous mockery of the original objective of helping the VIetnamese people. I do not belleve that we can end this war by slogans o! "get In or get out." It cannot be endeii by personal criticism o! the President and the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and other leaders of the Administration or members o! the Senate, regardless of the positions which they take on this issue. I am !rank to say that this crt tlclsm, a~ times, goes far beyond the merely ungracious and borders on the d!sgracerul. President Johnson wants this war ended 1n an honorable peace and every Senator I know, and I know them all, wants the same thing. I! there a.re differences among us they a.re differences o! understanding, Interpretation, and method. In my persona.! view, and have made It clear many times, the contllct cannot be terminated In an honorable fashion by a withdrawal or the United States at this time although an honorable settlement must eventually involve the withdrawal or United States forces. The only practical avenue which I see open, for the present, Is to seek to mitigate the horror o! the conflict and to restrain Its spread, while endeavoring to pursue any avenue, byway, route or whatever, a.s the President haa sought to do, which might lead to the negotiating table. That there has not yet been an initiation or substantial contact tor peace Is no argument against the continuance o! the effort to make that contact. There can be no relaxation until the war Is brought to an end In negotiations. It ts essential that we pursue peace in VietNam in all s!ncerl ty and with au diligence not only because, In this situation, peace has a rational and moral validity, but also because a prompt settlement Is 1n the Interests of the Vietnamese people and the interests of the American people. I must say, with great regret, that s!gn.s or a settlement 1n the near future are lacking. There is, Instead, the !act or an ugly war or spreading devastation. All the while, the options a.re runntng out; the alternatives which might lead to negotiations grow !ewer. Many proposals have been put forth and rnnny have been explored. As an example, over the past year or more I have publicly called attention to these possible easements o! the s! tuatlon and !or ~entual settlement: 1. In lieu or aerial bombardment or North VIet Narn, the sealing off of the borders of the 17th parallel, through Laos; 2. A reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis or the 1954 and 1962 agreements by call or ti1e cochairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, or by any participating conferees; 3. An all-Asian conference at Rangoon or Tokyo or any other suitable location to consider the conditions or an honorable peace; 4. The Inc! us!on in any peace conference of whatever belligerents may be necessary to br1ng about a termination or the conflict In VietNam; 5. An enlargement of the Manna Conference of 1966 into a follow-up conference, to include friend and foe alike; 6. A race-to-!ace meeting or the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and the Foreign MinIster o! the Peking government to discuss the restoration of peace in VIet Nam. In addition, I have urged that the closest consldertalon be given to Informed French views on VIet Nam and to the views or the Cambodian Premier, Prince Noroctom Sihanouk. I have urged that the proposals of U Thant and Mrs. Gandhi be considered. I have endorsed various statements or the President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all of which have made clear that not only our proposals but also those of Hanoi and the People's Liberation Front might provide a basis !or settlement. I have recommended tR.at there be not just a cessa t!on of the bombing of North VIet Nam but that all killing stop, on both sides, In a ceasefire and standfast, on the ground and In the waters adjacent to VIet Nam as well as over Viet Narn, to the end that efforts may be made to initiate talks. In some or these proposals, the President has concurred and has had them pursued by his diplomats. All or them, he has had examined and if they have not been pursued, I can only conclude that there have been sound reasons for not pursuing them. Suggestions for peace have come from many sources; the actual pursu! t of peace in the past year, however, has been by diplomacy and, largely, by secret diplomacy. Indeed, that Is t!le case even with the efforts or the distinguished Secretary General or the United Nations, U Thant. In his attempts to bring about peaoe in VIet Nam, U Thant has acted in his personal and diplomatic capacity rather than 1n hl.s Secretarial capacIty of carrying out organizational decisions or the United Nations. The !act Is that the U.N., as an organization, has not yet entered into the VIetnamese problem. Some limited use of the U.N. In this fashion, may I say, was proposed In an address which I delivered at Johns Hopkins University in November, 1966. At the time, it was not suggested that the United Nations be brought directly into the substance of the dispute; that cou"e presents great difficulties because neither North Viet Nam nor China a.re member states. What I did suggest, however, was an entirely proper and preceden ted procedural 1n! tia ti ve by the United Nations. The Security Council can Issue, at any time, by majority vote a call to all belligerents In Viet Nam to convene In Its forum. It would be entirely In order tor an Invitation o! this kind to Include both China and North Viet Nam. It was further suggested last November that a basis :ior a negotiated settlement could begin to be sought In a Security Council request to the International Court !or an advisory opinion on the appllcablllty o! the Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana May 15, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 86869 that were the operative provisions or a. number of these commitments to come Into play simultaneously, our ability to discharge them, short of nuclear confla.gra.tlon, would be most doubtful. In my judgment, all outstanding military commltments and activities ought to be subject to continuous scrutiny as to their current validity. From time to time we close surplus ml!1ta.ry bases at home. We ought not to be reluctant, In any sense, to reduce costly commitments abroad just as rapidly as their utlllty becomes questionable and their foreign pollcy purposes obsolete. In this connection, I would note the large U.S. mil!tary deployment In Europe. For a. number of years, six U.S. divisions have been stationed In Western Europe under NATO. These forces plus dependents add up to a quasi-permanent military establishment In Europe of over half a m!Jllon Americans. The annual outlay for this commitment amounts to b!lllons of do!Jars. Many have urged a. reduction of the deployment on the basis or cost or the gold drain and balance of payments dlfficultles or because of the competing needs of Viet Nam. The costs of the European deployment, to be sure, are a pressure on the domestic economy and the International position of the dollar. The expanding war In VIet Nam, to be sure, Is a.n open pit In terms of Its ever-growing requirements for men, sk.llls, and materiel. However, the critical Issue with respect to the U.S. deployment on European soU Is not, In my Judgment, a financial one; nor Is It the competing needs of Viet Nam. It we require the present level of forces In Europe, the nation can find a. way to deal with the financial and other difficulties which may be Involved. The Issue Is whether our security, the security of the North Atlantic region and the security of Western Europe-twenty years after World War !!--continue to compel the concentration or six American dlvlslons on tho other side of the Atlantic. What Is Involved here Is the accuracy of our current estimates of one of the critical components of our foreign policy. We need to ask ourselves whether conditions In Europe have changed since NATO was established. We need to ask ourselves whether the present level of the American comml tmen t Is out of step with that change. Let us not delude ourselves; while our military deployment under NATO has not changed for many years, circumstances In Europe have changed greatly In recent years. They have changed In Russia and Eastern Europe. They have changed In Germany and Western Europe. When the troop commitment to NATO was assumed, the keynote of relations between the Soviet East and Western Europe was one o! mutual suspicion and hostlllty. That Is not the case now. Today, the tone of Intra-European relations has the ring of a reasonableness that borders on cordlallty. Vice President Humphrey, on returning from his recent trip to Western Europe, was quoted as predicting that In 20 years the Iron Curtain would be replaced with an open door. Whatever the situation may be two decades hence, I venture to suggest, today, two decades after World War II, that the door Is already much more than sllghtly ajar, as between Eastern and Western Europe. The change ln the general climate Jn Europe Is reflected In the attitudes of the Western Europeans toward NATO. At one time, the European allles joined with us tn a w!Jllng pledge of manpower and resources to the buildup of NATO. Today, the actions of the Western Europeans speak far louder than words. The actions suggest that they have long since abandoned earller common concepts o! NATO force goals, at least lnso!ar as providing their share of manpower and materiel may be Involved. The French reaction In this respect has been abrupt and to the point. Although still adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty, France has withdrawn all divisions and other detachments from NATO. Moreover, President de Gaulle has required the removal of NATO headquarters from French territory. Great Britain has decreased Its commitment or men and resources to NATO and Is contemplating a further cutback of Its army of the Rhine. Indeed, all of the European NATO members, to one extent or another, have lowered the priority they attach to their mllltary consignments to the NATO command. It can hardly be financial dlfficultles that have caused the European all1es to veer sharply from earl1er mill tary pledges; In an economic sense Western Europe is far more capable of meeting these pledges today than when they were made. The retrenchment, Instead, appears to be grounded ln the conviction that the style ln which NATO was originally taUored ls no longer the mode for Europe. In these circumstances, It seems a paradox that we-alone and apart from our Western European all1es-have felt some compell1ng need to maintain at full strength the pledged deployment of forces In Western Europe. The fears for the safety of that region against Soviet aggression are obviously far greater In the Executive Branch of the United States government than they are In the European chanceries. This variance of view emphasizes the cataleptic nature of our pollcy on troop deployment ln Europe over the past few years. Of late, there have been lndlcatlons of a relaxation In this rigidity. Even though the reductions In the deployment which are being discussed would appear wholly Inadequate, It Is to be hoped that there Is at least a better appreciation of the realltles of change In Europe. Early this year, I joined with 43 other Senators In introducing a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive Branch make a substantial reduction In the U.S. m1!1tary deployment ln Europe. In my judgment, the actual size of the U.S. establ1shment In Europe ought to bear some relatlon.;hlp to what other NATO members are prepared to do with regard to the common defense. On this basis, I have belleved for some time that two or three U.S. divisions would be more In accord with current realltles than the six which are stationed in Europe. The lower figure would be no less effective In emphasizing that we regard the pledge of mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty as binding and that we hold our national security as Inseparable from that of Western Europe and the North Atlantic region. In all candor, I belleve there have been strong tendencies to lnertl.a ln foreign policy, under Democratic no less than Republlcan admlnlstrattons. The NATO situation, as I have just discussed It, 1s but one case In point. A lag Is also reflected In pollcles toward Eastern Europe. Only In recent years have these pollcies begun to take cognizance of the changes in that region. It Is true that President Eisenhower sought in his admlnlstratlon to reverse some of the excesses or cold war recrtmlnatlon. He tried to restore at least some c1v111ty to the conduct of U.S.-Sovlet affairs, for example, by his personal association with Mr. Khrushchev and other leaders of the Soviet Union. It Is true, too, that during President Kennedy's administration, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty removed a rlgldlty which !or years had decreed that no agreements, regardless of how useful, should be concluded with the Soviet Union. It 1s only been 1n the last year or two, however, that as a nation we have opened our eyes to the extent o! change In Eastern Europe and have begun to explore vigorously Its potentlalltles. We tend no longer to react with an automatic "nyet" when opportunities for understanding and mutual advantage appear. Rather, there Is a new sense or discernment which weighs op-portunltles In terms of our national Interest and lmpllcatlons for a more durable peace. The fact Is that such opportunities have been manifest for some time as a result not only or changes In Eastern Europe but also In the attitudes of that region towards Westem Europe. After World War II, the schism In the continent was a severe one. It was compounded of ancient rivalries, war-born vendettas, ldeologlca.l parochialism, reciprocal fears and the Inner ab<;orptlon of human energy In order to meet the great demands of survl val and reconstruction which existed In each war-shattered region. After the death of Stalln, however, there was a general loosening of straitjackets throughout Eastern Europe. This development was manifested ln various ways and notably In the growing response to consumer needs on the part of the Communist governments. The satisfaction o! these needs, In turn, Involved expanded commerce with the non-Communist world and Western Europe was quick to welcome lt. The rise of trade levels between the two regions ln the past decade has been very pronounced. It should be noted, moreover, that--Berlin Wall notwithstanding-West Germany leads all other non-Communist nations In commerce with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There has also been a rapid growth of communications, travel, cui tural exchange and other contacts between Eastern and Western Europe In the last ff!W years. How far this process has gone 1s Indicated by a recent Yugosla vlan announcement that visas would no longer be required of visitors !rom the West! These !acts o! change In EUrope speak for themselves. The talk of war subsidies; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more clearly on all sides. In short, a European detente has not only begun, It is already well advanced. Our reaction to change In Europe Includes the lnltlal achievements of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to which I have already alluded, as well as the lnternatlonal bridge bu1ldlng upon which President Johnson has embarked. What Is Involved In the latter case Is a sustained effort In the direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations. At the same time, the President Is seek.lng a significant reduction In the m1lltary-technologlcal rivalry which, wittingly or unwlttlngly, could lead the world Into a catastrophic conflict. A number ot slgnlflcant agreements with the Soviet Union are already associated ~th this effort. They deal with cultural exchanges, consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer space. Negotiations have been Initiated to try to 11m1t the lncredlbly costly arms competition of adding successive and reciprocal "antis" to the balllstlc missile systems of each nation. Most recently, as I have noted, a Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union has been ratified and just a few days ago by a vote or 88 to 0 the Senate consented to the ratification of a treaty on the peaceful use of outer space. Emotions run deep on any question of U.S. relations with the Communist nations, especially In the llght of the bloody conflict In Viet Nam. I am !rank to say that I have my own reticences In this connection. The pursuit o! agreements with nations of Eastern Europe seems incongruous with the war that Is being waged against us wl th their help on the other side of the globe. The best judgments we can obtain, however, tell us that the rejection of the kinds of agreements which have been made or are projected with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries w!ll not make the sllghtest difference In the mllltary situation ln Viet Nam, that It wlll, In no way, dlmlnlsh our casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict. Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana . 6 iO In Lha.e drcumata.n l do no a that It '"' our p~ to tum our ba b on agr m~nta which ld otheJTt.ec be In the Inter ta or thts nauon I do not eee that we adv ~ tb gmcral cau.e or by rdualn to bUild more at.able r laUona whcne er and wher ever an opportunity to do eo 1s r nt~ 11 the changes In Europe conaUtutc one or the critical components or the altuauon "'1th which United States foreign policy muat cone m IL&el!, a aeoond Is to be round In Aaln Along the II ttoral o! Ute Western PnciOc, thcr looma th" unapoken but no l proround confrontation with Chinn across the tea of Korea, Japan, Taiwan nnd VIet l'iam In that region, we hn. e Jet to r ohe the dlhmmu ot policy "hlch •orm posed by the O e Chln~ e c ntml government altered from one or grent Intimacy to one or grnat hostllttr 11><' Hu lana replaced U8 In the role of !rlcnd and mentor In the formulations or policy which were undert.llken by the Peking People's RC'publlc. C1111t In the role ot foreign de lve our problema In VIet Nam or A•la. Recent developments ronrernlng the supply or mntt'rlcl to North VIet Nam underscores this point In spite of the blttt'r antngonlsm, the Soviet Union and China have managed to work out an agreement which lnsurr.s the transshipment or Soviet supplies by wny or Chinn to Nortb VIet Nnm. The prospect would appear to bP, moreo\'er, tor a diminution rathrr Ulan an Intensification of Sino-Soviet ant1p11 hl~s at this time. Indeed, In the absence of basic changes In the situation, the level or Int-erdependence between Russin. and Chinn Is likely to continue to rl•e the longH the Vlrtnamese conftlct perslsta. In any event, we are restraIned by the "wnlt nnd SPe" approach from mnklng adjustments of policy which would tnke cognl?.& nce or changes In the Sino-Soviet situation I might add that we hn\'e wnlt.<'d for years, but It Is doubtful that we see our wny nnr more clearly today with respect to China than we did a ct~cade and a hlllf ago China remnlns a pu7.zlement, compounded of Ita Immense complexity and our profound be"'1lderment. It Is not likely thn events In Chln.'l. will ever fall. like Chinese cheekera, Into some simple pattern which will make It easy for us to de\ elop n ne"' policy v.1Lh respect to the Chine e mainland and Its three-quarters of a billion people WhntE"ur course we follow will lnvol ;ht any mtlltnry ... ay to a conclusion ,..hlch br.nrs " rational relation hlp to the original purpot;" tor which the commitment "'as undf'r hn It will be recalled that that purpolt' ,.1\1 to help the people or South Vtr.t Nam prr rrvc their fre~dom or polltlral choice and to assist th~m and all the p ple or Southeast Asla to build a belt< r mntr.rlal litn tor them elves Howe..er It mny evenlllally be brought to an end, It see-rna to me that thn war In VIet Nam ls not .,;otn to be rf"SSl\·ed hy p~rsonal criUctsm such u th:ll "'hlch from Ume to time, has been almffi at the Pr !den the VIce President, Amb ndor Ooldb,rg an a Conference on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements, by call of the co-chairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union or by any other participants; 3 . The holdlng In Rangoon or Tokyo or In any other suitable place of an all-Asian conference to consider the conditions o! an honorable peace In VIet Nam; 4 . The Inclusion ln a peace conference on Viet Nam o! any and all governments or groups whose concurrence may be necessary to bring about an end to the conflict; 5. The broadening of the M.mlla Conference of 1966 to Include China and other nonparticipating nations In Asla; 6. The arrangement o! a face-to-face meetIng of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Foreign Minister o! the Peking government to discuss the restoration o! peace In Viet Nam. rn ad M. t do not recall a single day In he two years alm<>&t that I have been at the UN where we have not had conversatlon.a on that aubject Those conversations &till continue here at UN New York and I thlnlt they continue In many capital& In thP world where we have representation, and our ad· versarlf'a have repre!~nta ton Mlaa W~trLL·TucKD> er the me ulng or thla v.ar, Ita nature and Ita ~nd and It haa been 118.ld that the dluent v.hlch haa been voiced sometlme.s •ul loudly and forcefully, Ia a complicating factor v.hlch put& oii an end an honorabl end t.0 t l e r Do )OU reel that aome limit& o r re' n slblUty, aa •cme pecJl' advocate &hould 1.. t • t to thla dlMenl? Thla Is Dick an old My own reeling Ia \Cn' ample I atat~ It aa a Juauc or the Su, 1 m Court 1 ha-e n c.t chan ed my mind use I took otr the robe Dl.aac!nt Ia all 1m· RD- b'ATE May 15, 19 7 pcwtan part or th Am :1 not~ n e wtth the ata n made t.nd I upr a VIew, that di.IMnt ~man be rNPOnalbJe..• Obvtouaty, all or ua uld lilt~ dtaaent t.0 bt ...,.ponalble but who 1.1 t.0 d l!n "r pon· atble?" It Ia out or the exellan e or .-lewa that we can a.rrtve at a right declaton The Government. and t apeak ror the ao ... emment at the UN, believes that It hu made the right declalona, but a democracr ntalla the right or anybOdy t.0 dSsaent. whether It 1.1 r ponatble or no Now, hat doea net m an that any cl l:1."n haa a right to enga In Illegal activity That 1.1 a dltrerent matter What Ia oont..rnrr t.O law Ia not the type or dlaaent contemplated by the First Amendment The First hmendment contemplate& tree dbcwaton It Ia only by tree dtacuMIOo we can ar: 1ve at correct declalona, and r don t think that ta a algn or wea.ltneaa, I think It Ia a algn ot strength and It Ia really what we are fight· lng about In VIetnam, that the people should have a right t.O expreaa themaelvea, and a right t.0 arrive at their own declalona, free from Coree. free trom violence, by the cru lble or tree dlacusa.lon. Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambaaaador-- Mr. Harrnrr. Congreaamen H~b~rt. ot Loulalana on Friday auggeat~ that the Firat hmendment be eet aside, you wouldn't agree? Amba&aadot GOLDBE&G, No, I don't f4P'I • m We are r&lll!y 1.0 negottata a IuUon ot t.ht oonntct We do not elt to tm a policy ot non-•H nno.e::.t.-ef al!anmrnt on 1J1e GO\"• ernment ot South Vlet.nam We are r dy that the:; ahould be nonaligned, l! that ta l.helr desire Our objective ta a almple one We cit ror them the people eor the Sou h , the right t.0 determine their o.,.·n d•Uny, tr.e rrom forte and rree from rcton Now, those are conttnulnr oala. The1 art far dltTerent !rom a ayatem where you aay the way t.O acttle thla war ta !or you t.0 ma.rcll up and surrender t.O th American P'orces 1 aee a great dltrerence In that But we cannot aettle the war by oul'lt'lvea Two p:trttes must aettle the war. Mr ACRON11KT, Mr hmbaaaador, there Ia gre t concern In the country, and throughout the world at the Inability o! thla Ad· mtnlatratton t.0 settle the war, and Senat.Or Aiken, ot Vermont, a.!ter the laauance of that White Paper by the Senata Republican Polley Committee, aatd he didn't feel thla Administration could settle the war, that It would take a Republican Admtntatratton t don't think Aiken waa really apeaktna only to political tenna. He really teela that this Administration hu arrived at a point ot Impotence In trying t.O aettle thla war. Would you agree: or courae you won' ? Am~ador GOLDBDO. Well, !!rat O! all, I ought t.0 con!esa aome prejudtcaa In the matter. I am a great admlrer O! Senat.Or Aiken I regard him to be one or !.he very great Senat.Ora In the United State& Senate. Secondly, when I took my aeat on the Supreme Court, I got out or polltlca and, deaptte what you may read about In the preaa and so on r am not going t.O re-enter the neld or pollttca. Thirdly, I regard thla sx-t or mine to be completely t.0 be non-political. I a~ak ror all ot the American people. t apeak tor the Government, but I a~ak !or a!! or !.he hmerlcan people. So that I do not enter. and would not enter, tnt.O thla queatlon or Republican or Democratic poelttona. I don't thlnlt Senat.Or Aiken speaks politically, I huten t.O add. Now, every Admlnl~tratlon , Republican or Democratic, repreBenttng the American people, will have t.0 try t.O nnd an honorable solution to thla war. I believe that all or our people, and everybody In all or our polltlcal parties, regardleaa ot their approach t.O the problem. want an h onorllble settlement, and the queatton Ia: how do you nnd It? I think our ad,erurtes are pretty reallattc I think that they know that the American people wlll suppert their Government In the attempt 1.0 nnd an honorkble aolutlon to the r, and tr they canno t lind an honorable aolutlon will auppert their Oo'ernment In the pursUit C f the Wilt, and therefore thla Government, this Admlnlatratlon, muat try to nnd a solution and It hu the aame problem thnt any admlnhtratlon will nnd, the o her aide muat Join It In Ita objective, and Ulat h.U been p rt or the dtl!iculty, We cannot get a dialogue cotn~r . m ny attempLI h&tt h n made to try and get a dialogue iOIOII that wlll brlr. about a concrete dbcu tonhen. · Is this wa.r t.0 be bruugh t t.O an honcrablo end? Thus rar "'e haven t b~n aucceutul but we hue t.0 ~r uere. Mr Ho1TU..rr Mr Ambaaaador, I would lllr.P t.O harken b ck 1.0 an rl!er point In your career You know u much about labor rela· t na aa anyone In th United Sta ea Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana _May is, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 86873 There Is a great deal of controversy, too, and a great clash of Interest between labor and management, In which the Government Is having to Intrude more than it has ever done. Do you think that, looking over the field with the collapse of a newspaper In New York, largely because of union pressure; with the automobile Industry facing Vf!rY serious contractual negotiations with the mattf!r of the rallroad strike; do you think that the tlme ls right for a whole new look at the Institution of collective bargaining: Ambassador GoLDBERG. Well, Dick. I am an ex-expert in the subject, If I ever was an expert. I constantly must seek new looks, but I doubt very much whether there are any magic solutions about major conflicts, just as I doubt that whether by the wave of a wand, which we would all like to find, a magic wand, we can get this contllct In VIetnam over. In our domestic area we have a great problem. We would like labor confilcts to subside. We would like them to be all solved, but would also like to preserve our freedom Now, all of the solutions to the grave labor confilets Involve trying to find a way to solve the problems and maintain freedom. This Is not easy to do, whether It Is newspapers In New York; whether It Is the railroads, so I suggest tha.t we don't do badly In our domestic scene, by and large, we get together settle oon!llct, as you know, since you are also Involved recently, that was settled. We had some problems on the television Industry. I think that the railroad conflict wtll l:ie settled. I believe It ought to be. I wish, I wtsh In the ln ternatlonal scene that we were as successful M we are In the domestic scene, when we have a grave con!llct. It Is much-! can testify by personal experience now, In two years, lit Is much more dlmcult to settle basic contllcts Internationally than domestically for a very simple reason-- rld. Mr. AGRONSKY. Why don't we use It for that purpose? Ambassador GOLDBERG. Now, we have tried. we brought the-the first efl'ort I made when I carne down here was to try to Involve the UN In finding a way to a peaceful settlement. As a matter of fact, It has been forgotten In all of the historical recitations. Quite early after I came down, In August of 1965, I brought a letter from the President encouraging the Secretary Gen!!ral to renew his activity ln this area. He had made prior efforts that were unsuccessful, I don't want to go Into the details of that. It has never been published, but I would !Ike to report that In August, 1965, an efl'ort was made by the Secretary General, we were cooperative, the adversaries were not. Now, after that, we brought the matter officially to the UN In late January, 1966, and we met opposition to that. We met It by the Soviet Union, we met It by France, and we had a debate, we Inscribed It on the agenda, we could not pursue It because Implicit was a. veto threat that If we dld, the effort of the UN would be vetoed. Just the other day, I said at the General A.o;..,embly that 1! the Soviet Union would withdraw Its objection, we could go to the Security CouncU tomorrow and take up what the UN might do to bring about peace. Mr. AGaONSKY. Old you say that to the So-viet representative? Ambassador GOLDBERG Yes, I did. Mr. AGRONSKY. Well. what did he say? Ambassador GOLDB!:RG. Well, he a.ald the UN hasn't got competence to deal with this subject. I don't agree with him. Miss WEILL-TuCKERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, when you brought the question to the Security Oouncll In January, '66, the same day. simultaneously came the announcement of the resumption of the bombing. This, of course, created a certain type of Impression that maybe was not too favorable tor a dispute. In the same way you have, I believe, recently, you, yourself accepted the latest plan of the Secretary General U Thant which calls for a cease-fire, stand-still truce, and General Westmoreland a few weeks later said that a cease-fire was not In the Interest of the United States. Now, how do you resolve these contradictions and the credibility gap that has developed at the UN and anywhere else? Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Anne, you have asked about ft ve q uestlons so I will try to answer them In sequence. First, when we carne In January, 1966, that was not my first effort to bring lt to the UN. I was perfectly willing, on behalf of the United States. to bring It In August. 1965, when that situation dld not exist. I was quite ready to bring It during the bombing pause of December- January, December, 1965, January, 1966. Why did I not do so at that time? Because everybody that I consulted down here said-now, this Is not a good tlme to bring It to the UN because there Is underway a diplomatic effort. This might Interfere with the effort. I consulted very broadly, and finally, when we brought It at the tlme we did, we had exhausted the posslblllty of arriving at a diplomatic solution during the bombing pause. and I recommended to the President, let us bring It, because It seems to me that everybody says, no good tlme exists for bringing lt. Now, about a cease-fire and the Secretary General's suggestion. The official response of the United States, the official-now, we are not going to-we talk about free speech, we are not going to prevent officials of the American Government, we are not a monolithic government, and If the President stopped General Westmoreland from expressing his sincere convictions, there would be a. great outcry In the press and on television that we are gagging the General The official position of the United States was given ln an official letter which I wrote and delivered to the Secretary General, with the approval o! the Government at the highest levels, In which we said: 1. You propose a cease-fire, we are agreeable. All we suggest, and I think quite rightly, Is that we have some conversations because a cease-fire must be an effective cease-fire, not that that means that every little bit of shooting wlll stop, but you have to arrange when will It take effect; how wtll armies disengage. We have practical things to do. Second, so that remains the position We are for a. mutual cease-fire, and we are ready today to talk about the modal! ties of such a cease-fire. That Is the position of the United States Government. Now, there are difficulties, as General Westmoreland, he Is a soldier, properly pointed out. But the official position of the United States Government Is, we are !or a cease-firf' Mr. AGRONSKY. How do you explain therefusal of the Soviet Union to permit the discussion of the VIetnam problem In the United Nations? Ambassador Gor.onrnc . Well, that Is a very troublesome thing. I wish the Soviet Union would join the United States In putting Its full force behind working out an honorable solution to VIetnam. I think It Is In their Interest. I think It Is In our Interest. We are the two largest world powers. The greater the power, the greater the responsibility to trv to work out world peace and worlcl S<·curity Now. how do you explain their attitude' They say they want a peace, we say we want peace; they say they want the Geneva Accords Implemented, we say we want the Geneva Accords Implemented. Then we fall npart. We fall apart because we say anybody, you, should do something about lt. You are a coChairman of the Geneva Conference, If you don't agree that the UN Is the place, join Prime Minister Wilson. reconvene the Conference, we will be there. We are ready to do It, we are ready to say that we ought to reaffirm the Geneva Accords. Mr. AGRONSKY. How do they answer that' Ambassador GoLDBERG. I think their answer is this, and it Is not a satisfactory answer by our likes. They say that we support the program of Hanoi In this matter. Hanoi has said we do not recognize the competence of the UN, we do not believe It Is necessary to go to Geneva. All that Is necessary to do Is for the Americans to get out and there will be peace In that part of the world. Now, that Is not so. Mr. AGRONSKY. Why dO we keep saying to ourselves and Indicating, as you do. and as all American officials do. that the Russians want peace In VIetnam? Yet, the Russians have continually stated that they will supply Hanoi with all of the help that they possibly can. There Is a fundamental contradiction here. How do you explain that? Ambassador GoLDBERG Martin. there Is a contradiction and we cannot resolve that contradiction. And. I do not say that we support what they do, quite the contrary. I would hope that the Soviets would resolve this contradiction In their own policy because I don't believe that that policy Is conductive to peace. I would hope that they would really come to terrns and use their Influence as they dld In Laos In 1962, to bring about a resolution of that particular problem that I know about. because I was In President Kennedy's Cabinet, which was not satisfactorily resolved because lt has not been honored by the Pathet Lao and the Communists, but at least we brought about a solution. I would hope they would do the same. On the other hand, because we cannot persuade them to do the same, that does not mean we should not try In other areas to try to bring about an accommodation of point of views. As a matter of fact, every time we bring about an accommodation of point of views In other areas, space, counsular treaty, nuclear nonprollfieratlon, we Illustrate the Inconsistency of their policy because here we are pursuing the paths of getting along. tryIng to minimize the area of conflict and we have an area where the conflict exists. We think they are Inconsistent not the United States-- Mr HOTrELET. But this approach toward agreement seems to have ground to a stop now, because the negotiations on the an tlballlstlc missiles system, the negotiations on the Treaty to ~an the Spread of Nuclear Weapons seem to be at least In trouble, 1f not broken down altogether Ambassadar GOLDBERG. No, Dick, I don't quite agree with that. It Is not easy to find accommodation, as I discovered when I was In charge of our team that negotiated the Space Treaty On the other hand, we made some significant steps this year. We have the air agreement, and while we have some technical problems, I think we will resolve them. We did agree upon the Space Treaty. We did agree upon the Consular Treaty. Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana ' 6 7t CONGRE IO~A.L RECORD- SE• 'tATE May 15. 1 ·ow. we hav raufted Ulem, by tlle y, and 1 am YUJ proud or our OOI.Ultry, that we •ere among the ftrat.. Naw we upect and an dpate Ul&~ Ule ~let Union will ratify tbem It 1a now up to Ulem l'\ow, on nu 1 r proll!eratlon. ~e ar ID n"ruaaUona and we have some problems •11.h our own alllea, we are ll")1ng to r....alve them 1 notice Mr Poo;ter hall gone to 1okyo It Ia natural that we should ha\'e to explain and make aure that all points or view are presentoo, ao I don t agrre that th~y have come to an end. lr. AGROI< KT, Well, we have run out of ttme, unfortunately, Mr. AmbasSador. I wish )OU could have concluded by l~JIIng u.s of a new spec~nc peace bid In which you nre operatlu , but apparently, &.II you aay, Its alwaya going on. Thank )OU Vel")' much for bt'lng here to Face the Nation Ambaasndor OoLDBEkC Thank you, l\larUn ANI ewa United Natlona Corr pond~nt Richard C. Hottelet, Anne Weiii-Tuckennan or Agence France-Presse. CDS News Correspondent MA.rtln Agronsky led the questionIng Next week, another prominent figure In the news will Face the Nation. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I join with the distinguished maJOrity leader, the senior Senator from Montana, in his recommendation. I agree with him that the hour Is growing late. During thc~c last 2 or 3 weeks, particularly since General Westmoreland was here, I feel that there has been an Increase In tension not only In this country, but also between this country and Russia. We have noted the Incidents that occurred in the Sea of Japan. They do not seem to be so important In and of themselves. However, I think they arc symptomatic of a ncrvous1.ess which could lead to world war III. I think the mention In the nc\\ sidcnt's own thought almost a year ago about the possibility of this war leading to world war III Is very om.lnous. I think that the .situation ccrta. l.nly warrants the recommendation that has been made by the Senator from Montana. I join with him in that reccmmendatlon. I also take this opportunity to pay my respects to the Senator from Oregon who, I believe, was the first Member of the Senate, that I can recall, who so stronclv recommended early In the conflict that It be taken to the United Nations. I think It is quite correct thnt we recognize his forcs!~tht m that connection. I wish I could think of something that could give 1mpetus to this idea. I am afraid I do not sec much Inclination on the part of the E.xecutlvc to move 111 this direction, however. There seems to ha\ e den· loped a feeling that notlung can be done either m or out of the Uni ed Nations and that we are now followmg an all-out military cour e. I hope that feeling Is not so and that th r ommendatlons of the Senator from • tontana wUJ be taken rlously. I con ratulatc him for h s \'cry etrec\ statement. lr lANSFIELD Mr. Pr !d nt, I thank U1c Senator. I hope that his fore-bod1n 1s not correct, beca the Ume 1s etUng pretty &hart I hope that v. v.ill refer this matter to the U • .. an organiza.Uon v.hlch, 1n my opinion, has no met Its rcsponslblllty from the very beginning of this conflict, and that 1f the Unll.<'d Nations docs face up to lh1s matter and a call is I ('(! to the VIetcong, the North VIetnam e, the Chln~P. and others to come to the conference table, that we v. !II be prcpart'd to accept the \erdict of the Unll.<'d Nations 1n that instance, \\hatc\cr It mny be. Mr. President, I yield to the dlstin~ lshcd Senator from Vermont. Mr. AIKEN. Mr. Pr 1dcnt, \\e hav this afternoon had two proposals mad to the Senate, each hopefully looking e1llwr to the dccscalat!on or th<' ending of thl' war in Southeast Asia The Senator from Kentucky !Mr. CooPER] recommended decsealatlng the war without In any way abdicating any r<'Spons!bil!ty that we mlght have In South VIetnam. The Senator from Montana [Mr. M~NSFIELol, recommended that we make an effort to reach some solution through the United Nations. These two proposals arc not lncompntJblc. They can both be tned out at the same time, and I hope that they wtll be The original purpose of the United Nations, one of the main purpo. cs of the United Nations, was to find a way in v.:hich to settle dissention among the nations without resorting to war. It has been successful in a small way, but only where the two parties to the controversy have both been looking for n way out. It so happens that a long time ago, well over a year ago, our Ambassador to the United Nations submitted a proposal to the Security Council for Intervening In or at least taking notice of the situation in South Vietnam. As yet, nothing has been done. I believe the United Nations Ls in a position where 1t must--as we say ln Yankee Land-"cut bait or fish" if it Is going to be an ctrective organiZation. If it proves that. it cannot be an effective and efficient organization, 1l can at least make an effort. The United States cannot be the pohccman for the whole world, and the trouble we arc having In one very small part of that world indicates that we could not posstbly police the entire world even If "e attempted to do so. I hope that the President will Instruct Ambassador Goldberg to lru !st. that the Security Council take some action If the Security Councll rcruS<'s to take any action, we will then know v.ho wants war and who does not. '\'\ant war In this v.orld of ours. If any of the the maJor nations, the five nations holding veto pov.er on the Security Councll, undertake to veto any effort at all, then U1ey must take the rcspons!bll!ly for cont1nu1ng au cnlatlon of the war In the world It is hard to bellcvc that they v.ill do that, butlt I possible I am not. sure that any of the plans or proposaL~ sutmltted to us today v.ill work. but we would certainly be negligent 1l we And 1t t.h ri tJ • · Uona do un-rc In the orld. v.hich th orl.gin I purpo or lh on;nnlzaUon-t.o mntntain pe ce In th v.orld nd U1 •t come forT rd v. !Ul a solution, eH n thou hIlls not 100 pcrcem v. hat t.h United Stat wan , I hope that the Pr I dent wIll tlt ton~ pt It It is high lm no t.h t we find ou v.ho really Is promoUn thl v. r In Southeast Asia and v.ho really wan to maintain pc cc ln the v.orld I bel!e\·e that other countrl<' b d the United Sta will br. In a pos!t.!on w hc1 e the rc p n lblllty v. ill rest upon thr!r shoulctrrs If we do not achieve any favorable re ult at all In the v. ~· of bringing the world to pcarc nca!n I ho1 that Pre !dent Johnson v.lll not. he hale to direct Ambn actor Goldbrrg to Ins! t upon action by the United Nations so that we may know once nnd for all "ho the real promoters of the wnr In the world arc. Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. Pr !dent, I thank the disl!ngu! hcd Senator from Vermont. Mr PELL. Mr. President, will he Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr PELL. Mr. President, I oclatc myself with the view of the majority leader. the di t!ngulshed Senator !rom Montana. I congratulate him on his speech. The basic reef upon which ncgollatlons betwe-en us, the NLF and the North VJCtnamr~ e founder is that our advrrar!C$ do not bel!cYc that we will a.::ccpt a govPrnmt> nt that rcpre cnts all the various factions of that unhappy country, South VIetnam. I think If the sugge tlons made todny were presenl.<'d to a United Nations or Security Council conference-or to any other conference-within the next few weeks and we agreed to accept the Tecommendalions coming from It, a great deal could thus be done to clcnr the air. I believe the Senator from Montana has put his finger on the sticking point when he said that he hoped we would accept with good grace wha~ver the results of the conference were. We did not accept with grood graPe the results of the Geneva Conference. We have usually been opposed to going to a conference and agn:c!ng to accept th,., result. I think we wIll hnve to publicly agree to accept the result.~ bl•fore going Into a conference. I hope that we "'Ill do so. I thank the dl tlngu! hed S nato1 from Montana Mr. MANSF IEI.D. r Pr !den , I yield to the di n ulshcd Senator from Kansas Mr. CARh<;ON Mr Pr sld nt,1t ems to me that Monday, May 15, may be a mcmorabl day In our VI nam war. T~~oo outstanding addr have been delivere-d In the Senate, one by the distinguished maJority lead!:!r, th othr.r by the able Senator !rom Kentucky I fr Coorr.R I, in regard to the concern of c!t.i- 7.ens about our 5lt.uatlon In VI tnam I bcheve th t t.hc cxpr ons In the Senate today sp k of the unrest In th 'at!on H ts prevalent v ryv.h r on g I sincerely hope t.hnt t.he dmlnl trat!on Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana 1\J(·'Y 15, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 86875 • v.rill give every consideration to the messages that have been given in the Senate this afternoon. I notice that several members of the Committee on Foreign Relations are in the Chamber. We all remember the extended and strenuous efforts on the part of the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MoasEJ, In our executive sessions, In regard to presenting this matter to the United Nations. I do not believe I speak out of turn when I mention that we have had Secretary Rusk before us on several occasions and have Instructed him to go to the United Nations and urge that they take action We have had Ambassador Goldberg before our committee and have expressed to him the importance of this situation being taken over by the United Nations. So I say today that this war will be settled at a conference table. and I sincerely hope that it will be settled soon. The messages delivered In the Senate today, which speak the minds and the feelings of Members of this great body, should reach not only our Nation's Capital, and the President's office Itself, but the United Nations and other countries as well. I sincerely hope that every consideration w!ll be given to these outstanding and able messages by Senators who are familiar with and have studied the International problem that has been expressed in the Senate this afternoon. I commend the distinguished majority leader. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Kansas for his kind remarks. I did not note that those who are on the floor this afternoon all happen to be members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, in some form or other. I yield to the Senator from Oregon. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the significance of the speech just delivered by the majority leader is very great. The significance is so great that I believe I violate no privilege by making the prediction that we will be coming back to this speech In the months ahead. I believe the speech outlines one of our last best hopes for trying to resolve the war in Vietnam on an honorable basis. It offers that hope to the world without leading to a dangerous escalation that may involve many of the countries with whom we are now pleading for diplomatic assistance Into World War III. The Mansfield speech really pleacls for resolving the war through existing peace keeping procedures of international law. I am in the presence of the majority leader, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Senator from Vermont, who have been my leaders and my teachers in many aspects of this troubled foreign policy area. I believe the Mansfield report of the fall of 1965, In which the Senator from Vermont !Mr. AIKEN] and the others of that commission Joined, paved the way for the discussion that we are engaged in this afternoon. The Senator from ArkallSM [Mr. FUI.BRIGHT) time and time again, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, has pleaded with and has sought to involve the State Department in rational discussion of the desirability of making use of existing peacekeeping procedures, of the United Nations charter and of other treaties under which we are committed. I believe the Senator from Montana this afternoon has well served the best interests of our country in this particular hour, in making a plea again that our Government should seek official resort to the terms and articles of the United Nations. But that is not the only recourse open to our Government. Comments have been made concerning my long interest in this matter. I appreciate the references which have been made to my consistent plans for the last 3 or more years that the administration should insist that the United Nations should take jurisdiction over the threat to the peace of the world which has developed in Southast Asia. The majority leader, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Vermont, have been very kind to allude to my record In this request and I thank them very much. The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] and I have had discussions about the desirability of having the United Nations intervene in this war by exercising its rightful jurisdiction under the charter. More than 2 years ago, at the President's request, I prepared two legal memoranda for him on the subject of our dealing with the international law aspects of this problem through the United Nations Charter. The second memorandum set forth a series of specific resolutions that the President had asked me to draft, which would conform to the existing peacekeeping procedures of the charter. The majority leader knows that of recent date those memoranda again were discussed. They became of current importance and were the subject of some consideration in an exchange of views with some officials within the administration. I wish to stress that many people who are now saying that the United Nations cannot be of help and that the United Nations is useless have not taken the time to study what the obligations of the members of the United Nations really are under the charter. One of the propooals I have urged, and urge again this afternoon-the only one I can speek about publicly, because it is the only one that has become public from other sources-is that some consideration be given by the Security Council to referring the whole matter to the General Assembly, Yes, I would add that consideration should be given by the Security Council to even recommending and expanding of the membership of the Geneva Conference as a suitable format for trying to aid the combatants to reach an honorable negotiated settlement. Such a format would not necessarily exclude the Security Council from a participating party to the negotiations. One of the arguments you hear is that China, North Vietnam, and the VIetcong do not belong to the United Nations. 0! course, the commitment under the United Nations is not that peace will be enforced only between members. The United Na-tions Charter places the obligation upon the members signatory thereto to enforce the peace, to prevent a threat to the peace against any country in the world or any combination of countries in the worldmembers or nonmembers-that threatens peace. That just happens to be the international law commitment of the signatories to the United Nations Charter. I believe the Senator from Vermont was correct when, a few moments ago, he pointed out what the primary purpose of the charter is. The United Nations was formed to enforce the peace, to prevent a threat to the peace, Any other program of the United Nations that has subsequently developed is ancillary to that primary obligation. I! the signatories are not willing to move to enforce the peace, then the United Nations Charter is truly a scrap of paper. If signatories to a treaty are not willing t
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|Title||Congressional Record Reprint - Vietnam|
|Creator||Mansfield, Mike, 1903-2001|
|Subject||United States--Politics and government--20th century|
|Collection||Mike Mansfield Papers, MSS 065|
|Series||Series XXI: House/Senate: Speeches and Reports, 1942-1977|
|Contributors||Archives and Special Collections, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Library, The University of Montana. For additional information about our collections visit our website: http://www.lib.umt.edu/asc . To suggest a keyword or share what you know about this item e-mail email@example.com|
|Relation||For further information connect to the online guide for this collection: http://nwda-db.orbiscascade.org/findaid/ark:/80444/xv87911|
|Provenance||Gift of Mike Mansfield|
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United States of America Vol. 113 Co;v ( Oo Q:ongrcssional Record PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION WASHINGTON, MONDAY, MAY 15, 1967 Senate VIETNAM Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have read with great interest the speech by the distingushed Senator from Kentucky 1 Mr. CooPER l, and I also listened to what he had to say and the colloquy which ensued subsequent to his deliverance of the speech. I commend the Senator from Kentucky !Mr. COOPER] for showing his usual calmness, good judgment, restraint, and wisdom in what he has to say, and to assure him that he has a great deal of company in what he has said. When it comes to worrying about the situation in Vietnam, it Is the shadow which affects all our lives, and it is preeminent to the consideration of any other question. When I think of how much Vietnam is costing us in men and money, it makes me sad indeed to consider the tragedy which is the lot of tlus country in that far distant land. We became involved in Vietnam because of mistakes, because of miscalculations, because of misunderstandings, and because of good intentions. As was pointed out in the Senate this afternoon by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota !Mr. YouNG], it is too late to question how or why we got into Vietnam. The question is moot. It belongs to history. There is no question, as far as any Member of the Senate is concerned that I know of, of withdrawing from Vietnam at this time. But I do think the overriding question, if not the only question, in the mind of every Senator, regardless of his position on this subject, whether he is labeled a dove or a hawk, or has no label, is to find a way to the negotiating table, to the ways in which an honorable truce, or an honorable peace or an honorable settlement, can be achieved. It was brought out that perhaps the bombing should be suspended, and that thrs would pave the way to negotiations. Frankly, I would like to advocate a suspension of the bombing, because I have never advocated the bombing itself; but I feel, if we were to suspend the bombing and there were no reaction on the part of North Vietnam, the reaction on our part, both government and people, would be far more bitter and far more dangerous than is the situation at the present time. Perhaps the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] has given us a way out by means of which bombing would be confined to interdiction of supply routes and would increase at the 17th parallel and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It is certainly a proposal worthy of consideration. As far as the membership of this body Is concerned, I wish to state that I believe in the right of dissent. No matter how a Senator is labeled, he does have a right to dissent and the right to express his opinions as he sees fit, but always, I would hope, constructively. I would not consider even those who say, "Go in all the way" or who want to turn North Vietnam back into the Stone No. 75 Vietnam and the United Nations - Johns Hopkins, Nov. Central Concerns of American Foreign Policy North €ritical Components of Current U.S. Foreign Policy 10, 1966 Carolina, March 13, 1967 Cleveland, April 30, 1967 Face the Nation CBS,News, ~ May 7, 1967 Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana 86864 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 15, 1967 there Js ever present the possibility of Its eruption into a war of regional, continental or world-wide dlmenslons. The con!llct In VIet Nam may end, of course, long before It matriculates Into war with China or universal nuclear catastrophe. That Is certainly the rational hope Whether or not It Is an attainable hope Is another mater. In any event, the VIetnamese confilet now, today, already has the capacity to shake the precarious base of cl vlllzed human survival. That will continue to be the case unt!l the war begins to yield to rational settlement. Whatever else It Is, therefore, the war In Viet Nam Is a most urgent warning to all nations. It flashes a danger signal with respect to the adequacy of the present International Instruments of peace. These instruments have not only failed to prevent a breakdown of peace In Viet Nam; they also appear Incapable of restoring peace In any prompt and generally acceptable fashion. It Is high time, therefore, to note with emphasis that the structure of International order which has evolved during the past twenty years Is, to say the least, dangerously haphazard. As It Is now, each state has Its own formula for safeguarding the security of Its people. Each state tends to blend Into that formula, In various combinations, a supply of unl!ateral military power and a participation In a variety of bilateral and regional defense arrangements. Each nation adds to this mixture Its own version of traditional diplomacy and modern variations thereon. Almost all nations complete the blend with a dash of the United Nations. Of late. the role of the United Nations has become less and less pronounced. Indeed, with respect to VietNam the U. N. presence Is scarcely discernible. It Is true that the distinguished Secretary-General. U Thant, has taken public note of the confilct In VIetNam and Its dangers to the world . The SecretaryGeneral Is a man of pence and an exceptional diplomat. He has made clear that he Is more than willing to place his dedica tion and his skills at the disposal of the disputants In Viet Nam. In his diplomatic role, he has outlined views which might provide at some points a basis !or a settlement of the confilet and he has, otherwise, sought tactfully to engage the Interest of various parties In a settlement. With all due respect, however, the sincere efforts of the Secretary-General are hardly to be equated with bringing to bear on this situation the potentials of the United Nations. VIet Nam Is, clearly, a breakdown In the peace within the meaning of the Charter. It contains, clearly, the threat of an expandIng war. With these characteristics, It would appear that the contuct should long since have triggered the utilization of every resource of the United Nations In an effort to restore peace. Yet, I regret to say, that apart from the personal efforts of the Secretary- General, the U.N. reaction to VietNam has had something of the character of that of a disinterested, enervated or Impotent onlookPr. It Is almoot as though the oonfilct In VIet Nam were taking place not on the other side of this planet but rathe: on some other planet entirely. It may be, of oourse, that the U. N. Is unable to make a contribution to peace In Viet Nam. It may also be, however, that the !allure to seek a contribution from the U. N. Is a missing link In the restoration of peace In VietNam. Whatever may be Involved, the non-role of the United Nations In this situation ought not to go unnoticed. An embarrassed silence 1.s no longer a sufficient rooponse to the nation's needs or to the world's needs Urgent though It Is, there Is more Involved In these needs ev-en than ending the war In VIet Nam. There le also at stake the prevention of a more monstrous confilct. There le also at stake the continued Cl'