s 20784 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE Dece1~~ber 19, 1970
vised, I believe to face frankly the reality
that there is more to bringing about an
end to our involvement in Indochina.
than the removal of a. substantial part
of our expeditionary forces from Vietnam-
a step which I do not deprecate
·but commend in every way. The fact is,
l1owever, that what we are dealing with
ii; hydra-headed. While the drawndown of U.S. ground forces has helped to re
·quce casualties in one area, the other
eittrapments have tightened their hold
u)Jon this Nation.
·I would hope the Senate, therefore, in
the closing days of the expiring Congress,
in )l time of haste and weariness, will
no(have acted in a fashion which lends
encouragement or support in any way,
shape, or form to a deepening of this
tragrdy which has already done so much
to e!·ode the foundations of the Nation's
unity and stabl!ity.
I Would hope, too, that the President in
his Continuing search for a responsible
settlement, might oonsider directing
that a pointed effort be made to seek
new ingresses to a. peaceful solution
either \11 Paris or elsewhere. It seems to
me tha~ the executive branch might try
to concentrate its negotiating attention
a.t this time in an effort to determine
whether the release of all U.S. prisoners
of war might not better be secured as a
quid pro quo, if we were prepared to set
forth a timetable for the progressive
withdrawal of the balance of the U.S.
forces in Vietnam at this time, both
events to take place under the umbrella
of a ceasefire which would bring, of
course, an immediate end to all U.S.
casualties. Something along these lines
is within the scope of the President's
October 7 statement. At the same time,
the release of U.S. prisoners is within
the scope of peace proposals which were
made by North Vietnam on September
This week, at the 95th session of the
peace talks in Paris, Madam Nguyen Thi
Binh repeated a previous proposal offering
an immediate cease-fire in Vietnam
In return for a declaration of United
States and allied troop withdrawal by
June 30, 1971.
She also stated that U.S. acceptance
of this proposal would mean immediate
negotiations on the release of captured
American prisoners. Madame Binh ignored
the U.S. proposal that meetings
be held every day to try to bring about
the release of all U.S. prisoners by Christmas.
· Shortly after that meeting concluded,
Xuan Thuy, the chief of the North Vietnamese
delegation, noting that Ambassador
Bruce has rejected the proposal
for a U.S. withdrawal by June 30, 1971,
I , t herefore, propose that 1! the United
States ls not wllllng to accept June 30, 1971
as the dAte !or final Withdrawal o! all lts
troops, then lt should suggest another r easonable
date. In that case, we can Immediat ely
collslder the American suggestion.
At the 95th conference, Ambassador
Bruce, after calling for "immediate negotiations
on an internationally ·supervised
ceasefire-in-place throughout all
of Indochina," repeated the readiness of
the United States to negotiate on an
agreed timetable "for complete troop
withdrawal as part of an overall settle-ment
in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."
Perhaps in this give-and-take at Paris
and also based in part on the President's
proposals of October 7 and Hanoi's proposals
of Sept~mber 17, the two points
to which reference is made-that is, the
release of all U.S. prisoners of war coupled
to a timetable for the final withdrawal
of U.S. forces-might be explored
exclusively-and I emphasize that word
"exclusively" because that would mean
setting these two issues apart--to see
whether ' or not t hey may be reconciled
as a starting point of a ceasefire to be
followed by the negotiation of a complete
settlemen t. It would be my hope, Mr.
President, that this approach may light
a clear signpost to peace.
May I say that I submit these thoughts
with an 1Ul.derstanding and appreciation,
I think, of the complexities and L'ltransigences
wh ich confron t the President.
I submit them, nevertheless, in concern
lest we find ourselves operating under a
new fail-safe-deeper within this tragic
involvementr-a new point of no return
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, would
the distinguished Senator from Missouri
(Mr. EAGLETON) yield briefiy to me, without
losing his righ t to the fioor?
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I am
willing to yield for a brief period to the
Senator from Michigan with the understanding
that I do not lose my right to
the fioor and that on resuming the fioor
my remarks do not constitute a second
speech. I do wan t to add that I have a
gentleman's understanding with the
Senator from Nevada y are
as far from bonafide negotiation" as they
have ever been.
All 1n all, then, we would be well ad-
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 46 , Folder 90, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
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