17144 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE July 21, 1965
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
situation in Viet Nam, in the words of
President Johnson, Secretary McNamara
and others, is likely to get worse before
it gets better. What the Secretary will
report to the President as a result of his
week in Viet Nam is, of course, not
known; but it appears that the groundwork
has been laid for a further intensification
of the military effort in Viet
Nam. Obviously, if this continues the
American presence is going to assume
the predominant role in that conflict.
There is talk of a reserve call up, extended
enlistments, added defense appropriations
and the like. It is even
anticipated on our side that the war may
go on for 4 or 5 or even 10 years and Ho
Chi Mh;th, President of North Viet Nam,
has stated in the last day or so that he
is prepared for a war of 20 years duration.
It is interesting to note and not surprising
that what is occurring in Viet
Nam is now being caled "an American
war" by one columnist and another columnist
states that in South Viet Nam:
"It is real war there at last."
The President has gone down many
tracks in an effort to enter into "unconditional
discussions" to pave the way
for negotiations which might end the
hostilities in VietNam. He has met with
silence or rebuffs at every turn. U Thant
has endeavored in a quiet way to use the
facllities of the United Nations. A proposed
Commonwealth Group which
would go to Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and
Washington has ben advocated and rebuffed.
A representative of the British
Government has gone to Hanoi. Mr.
Mr. Harriman has gone to Moscow ; all
with no success.
It is my understanding that in the immediate
past Ho Chi Minh has extended
an invitation to President Nkrumah of
Ghana to come to Hanoi but instead of
Mr. Nkrumah going, he is sending
Ghana's High Commissioner in London.
A glimmer but only a glimmer of hope
may come out of this meeting.
It is of interest, I think, to the American
people to note the comments of General
Nguyen Cao Ky, the present premier
of South Viet Nam-one of a long line-in
a recent TV program with Walter
Cronkite. I do not have the complete
copy of the interview but I am inserting
at the conclusion of my remarks an article
by one of the most competent foreign
policy analysts in the nation, Mr. R. H.
Shackford of the Washington Daily
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
that that be allowed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
brought to a stalemate--American GI's a.re
going to have to do the bUlk of the Job.
Each day brlngs further evidence that the
South VIetnamese a.re in a bad way, mllltarlly
and pol!tlcally. The unthinkable o! a
few months ago--VIetnam becoming an
American wa.r-ls now routinely accepted
South VIetnamese Prernler Gen. Nguyen
Cll() Ky has virtually admitted that the
Americans will have to play a bigger and bigger
role In the war Lf It Is to go on.
He Ls the same man who talks with bravado
about "l!berating" North VIetnam while conceding
that be cannot "l!berate" th·e south.
General Ky Ls the flamboyant, high l!ving
chief of the VIetnamese Air Force who. !or a.
month, bas been the latest or a long line of
He appeared over the weekend on a. nationwide
U.S. television show and gave some
disturbing Information about the sta tu.e of
First, General Ky conceded that the people
o! South VIetnam a.re "Indifferent" about the
wa.r. Many. be admitted, will not participate
Ln the wa.r eltort because they are disgusted
with the continuous changes In government
Ln Saigon and, t.bus, have no con.l\dence
Ln any government.
Second, be promised more confusion
among the VIetnamese military and govern-ment
hierarchy by pn>mlalng a.n tb~
thorough purge o1 both
Tb.Ls would be t.he umpt.eont.h "pur ~ .. Ln
the la.st 2 years- the Vletcon& gainln iJ'ound
on each one.
Thlrd more Amerlca.n ora ~ nC«<~ . he
aald, so that the bUill: of the South VIetnamese
Army could ··reorga.nlze \.he rear."
He sugge6Led thM US. troope hold " Ule
perlmeter"-apparently meaning do the
tlghtlng against the VIetcong.
The Ky TV lntenlew wu bTOA.dcaat In t.he
United States while Deren e Secretary Robert
McNam.ru-a was In Vletna.m. rocel,lng ppeals
from General Ky and U.S m.lllta.ry omclals
there tor more American ground rorct'S
Mr. McNamara's Saigon trip appeared primarily
to be a well-staged operation for preparing
the American people tor more bad
new&--because the decision to send more
American troops to VIetnam wu made long
before Mr. McNamara. lett the United States
The United States now bas more than
75,000 uniformed men In VIetnam, plus another
20,000 olt the shorea or that country
wl ,b the 7th Fleet.
The Joint Chiefs of Stat!' are understood
to have recommended that the United States
plan to have 179,000 men on the ground In
VIetnam by the end of the year.
General Ky came closer to disclosing the
dire outlook In Vletnant than any U 8 otllclo.l
President Johnson has said the situation
wLII get worse before It gets better. But no
U.S . otllclal bas even hinted, as General Ky
did, that tbe war Is eo cl06e to becoming
overwhelmingly an American war
The VIetnamese manpower situation long
bas been deficient. For years there have
been brave promises ot major recruiting and
conscripting-but each campaign has fallen
short of goals.
The South VIetnamese M!Htary Establishment
usually Is said to total 550,000 men
Less frequently It Is explained that only
250,000 or those are Regular Army soldiers,
the rest being various paramilitary units
ranging all the way down to policemen
The "numbers game·• on the VIetcong goes
on. Last week they were said to have 65,000
regUlars. supported by 80,000 to 100.000
Irregulars or part-time euerrlllas.
U.S. otllclals claim that the rate of Infiltration
!rom the north, Including Regular North
VIetnamese Army nnlt.s, has Increased rapIdly
In recent months. Major "search and
kill" operations, however, have !ailed so far
to flush any large enemy groups !or combat
In the Jungles.
In justifying the huge Increase or U.S.
ground forces In VIetnam and the plans !or
more, the United States emphasizes primarIly
the larger numbers Invading !rom the
General Ky was the first to Indicate--however
Indirectly-that another major reason
tor needing more GI'a Ia the disintegration
In the south.
SmANOUK DIScussES CAMBODIAN CoNFutENCE
To the Eorroa:
In your May 6 editorial (Internal ed.IUon
May 7) you analyze the reasons which Impelled
Cambodia to sever diplomatic relations
with the United States.
You write that this decision stemmed rrom
my convictions that I could avoid v868alage
to China. by paying occasional " political
tribute." A little further you say that I try
to avoid Chinese Interference In my country
by making conceealons to China In foreign
You attribute to me sentiments, that are
not at all m.lne, a.nd thua you create 1m unfortunate
contusion In the minds of your
Last month I wrote in the monthly review
Knmbuja published In Pnompenh. I have
never had the allgheat Illusion on the tate
that nwalts me at the ha.nct. of the Commu-
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 17, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
17146 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
nlata, a.a well as that which Is reeerved tor my
government, atter having removed trom our
region the In!! uence e.nd especially the presence
ot the tree world, and the United States
In an editorial which will appear shortly In
this same review, I concede again that atter
the disappearance ot the United States !rom
our region and the victory ot the Communist
camp, I myself and the people's Socialist
community that I have created would Inevitably
disappear !rom the scene.
I know the Chinese well enough to understand
that they cannot be bought and that It
Is perfectly useless to bend before them, or
to play their game occa.sslonally In the hope
ot extracting some ulterior advantage. U I
acted thus, I would be despised, and rightly
so, by the Chinese people, who would not
alter their plans one Iota so tar as my country
But there Is one thing that you Americans
seem Incapable ot understanding. And that
Ia that Cambodia has broken off with the
United States ot America not because It Is
a "pawn ot Pelplhg," as you write, but tor
reasons ot dignity and national honor that
we have • • • placed on Cambodia, you display
obvious spite In saying that the tault
ls mine and that because I allow myselt to
by "maneuvered by Pelplng," the meeting
may not take place.
As tor the prospect ot an International
conference taking place on Cambodia, you let
It be known that the tault lies with me
because I allow myself "to be run by Pelplng,"
that the meeting wlll not take place.
But then you Immediately point out that
this conference was Intended "In part to provide
a way tor exploratory conversations on
Vietnam." And this Is repeated and emulated
by all press ot the tree world. We
Cambodians have come to the conclusion
that the neutrality ot Cambodia and our territorial
Integrity do not concern you at all
and that this conference Is simply, In your
eyes, a good way to sound out the ultimate
Intentions ot the VIetnamese and tl.e Chln~se
ln regard to South VIetnam and that you wlll
link our problem to that ot VIetnam. by refusing
to give any guarantee whatever to
Cambodia I! the Communists remain Intransigent
The Peo ple's Republic ot China, the Soviet
Union, and the Democratic Republic ot
VIetnam have stated clearly their determination
not to accept the government ot Saigon
as partner In an International meeting.
We, ourselves, are well aware that the government
ot Saigon has lost control ot almost
!our-tl!ths ot the Vietnamese border with
Cambodia, and we are also aware ot the tact
that Saigon persists In claiming the coastal
Khmeres Islands, while the National Liberation
Front ot South Vietnam and Hanoi
acknowledge our ownership
Nevertheless-and In an effort to arrive at
a solution In such a dtmcult context-! advised
the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson,
who had sent me on May 11 an urgent
message, that Cambodia would accept the
conference on two conditions:
First ot all, that the conference should
concern ltsel! with the Cambodian problem
to the exclus ion ot the Vietnamese or Laotian
problem. Then, that the Interested
powers: Great Britain, U.S.S R., the United
States, France, and the People's Republic ot
China, should agree In advance on a solution
which would satlsty all, on the problem ot
the representation ot South VIetnam.
I pointed out to Mr. Wilson that there
were tour posslbllltles: ( 1) that South Vietnam
should not be rep-esented at the conference;
(2) or shoutd be represented by the
National Liberation Front; (3) or be represented
by the Government of Saigon; (4)
or finally be represented bilaterally: one seat
to the NLF, which Is supported by the Socialist
camp, and another seat to the Gov-ernment
or Saigon, which Ia backed by the
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